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Both management style and corporate culture are specific to the 
management team which make up a particular organisation, and are 
held to be a key det8rhIant in its success. Yet while a 
mismatch in.corporate cultures has been blamed for the failure of 
some acquisitions, the degree of managerial 'fit' has received 
little recognition as a-determinant of acquisition success. This 
paper argues that the importance of Management within the 
acquisition process is understressed, and that to improve the 
probability of success the acquiring management team must 
demonstrate increased rigour in identifying and cultivating 
managerial 'compatibility. 
In 1985 UK companies completed acquisitions worth f9 
billion. In addition there were outstanding bids at the year end 
valued at a further Cl0 billion, giving a total committment for 
the year greater than the UK defense budget. 
In addition 1985 saw - Daimler Benz fight a long battle for 
control of Dornier. 
- ITT planning to sell $1.7 billion of 
assets worldwide. 
- Volvo merging its machinery 
operations with Clark, and buying two 
pharmaceutical companies. 
- Nestle offering $58m for Life Savers 
of Australia. 
- Beechams buying Zambiletti of Italy. 
This level of activity has in turn led to concern about the 
status of anti-trust legislation with conflicting demands for 
complete 'deregulation at one extreme and at the other the 
conviction that all mergers above f16m should be held to public 
scrutiny with the onus on the acquiring firm to demonstrate that 
the ex-post corporation would benefit society. From the academic 
world, White (1981) argues that mergers have not led to a 
concentration of industrial strength as measured by value added, 
profits or employment, and therefore are not against public 
interests. In contrast, Pickering (1980) argues that the public 
benefits of acquisitions are so difficult to predict, or realise, 
that they should be more strongly regulated. Indeed many would 
. 
argue that Government intervention in the acquisition process 
over the past 20 years has a very dubious performance record: 
many thwarted companies being in a state of limbo, or worse, 
going out of businsa8. In 1967 th8 Commission blocked the merger 
between UDS and Burtons leading to the slow decline-of UDS until 
it was dismembered in 1982. Similarly in 1975 the shipping 
industry's attempt to pool the container resources of Furness 
Withy, Manchester Liners and Euro-c*anadian was blocked leaving 
tha participants with limited financial success 
From the commercial world, lavish adverts in the quality 
press are now a normal part of the acquisition process as suitors 
compete t9 woo shareholders. Advertising in the recent 
Guiness/Distillers/Agyls battle was estimated at f2m per week - 
a substantial bill to be paid by the shareholders. News and 
advertising footage increases in line with the passion generated 
and the premiums paid. 
Passion itself appears an important element in the current 
fi@Merger-Mania I( and is reflected in the terminology used. 
"Predators" and ttCorporate Raiders" are countered with "Shark 
rep811ants14 and llPoison pills". Beleagured directors leap to 
safety with their "Goldan Parachutes" or swoon into the embrace 
of a White Knight 14 who rides to their rescue while the l'Arbies'@ 
pick over the bones. 
Gone Ls the security of size; gone is the safety of good 
performance and growth; loyal shareholders are made l'offers they 
can not refuse". And gone, apparently, is the dispassionate 
approach to the rational business declsidn.' Inevitably the 
question therefore must be asked "Is it all worth it?" 
Acauisition Performance 
The findings of the European and US studies concerning the 
impact of mergers on corporate performance which relate entirely 
to publically-quoted companies may be summarised as follows: 
1. Returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms are at 
best slight and tend to disappear rapidly, and, at worst, 
are significantly negative. 
2. Returns to the shareholders of acQuired firms are 
strongly positive. 
3. Gains and losses of victims and predators became a ze,ro- 
SUIU. 
4. In certain cases a failed bid leads to improved stock 
market valuation. 
5. Acquisitions were unlikely to reduce risk. 
Acquiring Companies: 
Strong evidence exists of increases in share value and 
abnormal returns to the acquiring firm in the period leading up 
to the announcement of the merger bid: However, following the 
announcement a reduction of this initial gain is generally 
observed, either as a sharp decline immediately following the 
acquisition event or as a more gradual decline which may take up 
-- . . - - _. . 
Acquired Companies: 
In counterpoint, general agreement exists that the 
shareholders of the acquired company do considerably better out 
of the deal. Franks, Broyles h Hecht (1977) found gains of 20% 
to the victim's shareholders in the three month period before an 
acquisition was announced. This led them to consider the 
possibility of "insider trading M leading to speculation in the 
victim's shares. Their work was confined to the Brewing Industry 
but is confirmed by wider studies which identified abnormal gains 
of 22% - 30% to the victims shareholders in the 40 days before 
the acquisition announcement. 
Zero-sum: 
Firthls (1980) study of 434 UK acquisitions concluded that 
no aggregate advantage accrued since the gains accruing to the 
victim were cancelled by the losses of the attacker. By adding 
the gains to the victims shareholders to the apparent long-term 
losses to the shareholders of the acquirer, Firth confirmed +e 
hypothesis of Perfectly Competitive Acquisition Markets. This 
proposes that competition among acquiring firms will cause the 
value of expected benefits from merging to be paid to the 
shareholders of the firm being acquired. 
Bid failure: 
Firth's study also found that unsuccessful attackers 
outperformed the market In the twelve months following the failed 
bid, a result supported by Dodd & Ruback (1977) who found that 
subsequent to the rejection of a bid, the target's shares failed 
to fall back to their pre-offer level.. . .' 
Risk: 
Continuing the search for explanations as to the popularity 
of acquisitions as a strategic weapon, various studies examined 
whether acquisitions were used to reduce the risk associated with 
a particular firm by managers. These conclude that while certain 
types of acquisitions can reduce systematic (market related) 
risk, they are not an effective means of reducing unsystematic 
(firm related) and total risk. Indeed Langetieg, Hangeu f 
Wichern (1980) found that acquisitions tend to be associated with 
increased levels of systematic, unsystematic, and total risk for 
the merged firms. 
What nrice failure? 
Underpinned by these scholastic conclusions, it perhaps 
should come as no surprise that the last merger boom of the 
1970's - the Conglomerate Wave - has resulted in considerable 
disillusionment. Divestment and a call for a "back to basicsft 
approach appeared to gain strategic favour. Good examples are 
Mobil Oil pulling back from mineral extraction and the Imperial 
Group finally finding a buyer for their HoJo hotel chain. 
Despite this these same companies are back on the 
acquisition trail undeterred by their highly visible mistakes. 
Is this the proverbial triumph of Hope over Experience or is 
there something fundamentally different in the nature of these 
acquisitions which leads to an expectation'of success? 
Kitching (1967) identified variables such as the relative 
size of the companies, the market share position of the acquiree, 
the retention of acquiree management, and the post-acquisition 
integration process and related these variables to success as 
defined by the management of the acquiring company. He suggested 
that management of the acquiring firm would increase the 
likelihood of success by "matching the availability of managers 
of change with the tasks of the newly merged enterprise“, and by 
specifying at the outset the control system to be used and 
sticking to it. Salter and Weinhold (1979) similarly decided 
that successful acquisition outcomes were due to the 
florganisational structure and human resource skills of the 
acquirer, coupled with latent synergistic possibilities.lt 
These statements imply that in- unsuccessful acquisitions, 
either no synergistic benefits accrue to increase shareholders' 
wealth, or, that the acquiring companies lack the management 
ability to release the available benefits. The continuing 
popularity of acquisitions leads us to focus upon this latter 
belief. Despite its early promise little empirical research 
activity has extended Kitching's early work in linking these 
management features to acceptable measures of acquisition 
performance. 
Industry 'fit' 
Relatedness or degree of "fit" between acquirer and acquire 
has been used in different stages of the research into 
acquisition performance. The degree of industry relatedness was 
thought to explain acquisition success until Cowling's recent 
study demonstrated that the relationships held true only in high 
profit industries and not in low profit industries, thus,linking 
both industrv performance and acquisition performance. 
Management 'fit' 
Kitching identified a refit" between company characteristics 
(size, market share) in those acquisitions acknowledged as 
successful by the managers concerned. Norburn (1986) tested the 
characteristics of top managers within the UK's largest companies 
against the performance of those industries in which they were 
strategically competing. He found significant differences in :$ 
management characteristics between industry sectors categorised 
as growth, turbulent and declining. This work extends the upper! 
echelon theory of Hambrick and Mason (1985) which posits that to;:' 
management characteristics will, partially, predict k, 
organisational success. 
We therefore believe that the relatedness which actually 
existed in the earlier acquisition studies could be a relatedness 
of management characteristics and style which in turn leads to 
successful acquisition outcomes. 
Conversely, the lack of relatedness or Itfit" may become 
evident at various stages in the acquisition process. When 
Levinson (1970) looked at merger performance he contended "that 
some psychological reasons for merger not only constitute a 
major, if unrecognised, force toward merger but that they also 
constitute the basis for many, if not most, disappointment and 
failures". He concluded that these hidden psychological reasons 
for acquisitions led to a condescending attitude towards the 
victim which results in efforts to manipulate and control which 
in turn led to "(a) dissillusionment and the feeling of desertion 
on the part of the junior organisation and (b) disappointment, 
loss of personnel and declining profitability for the dominant 
organisationn. 
Similarly (Hayes 1981) suggested that expectations of the 
future relationship are created during the acquisition 
negotiations. When these expectations are not met ex-post facto, 
executives become dissillusioned, morale falls, performance 
declines, and executives leave. The failure to link the 
negotiating team and the Implementation team is also identified 
as a stumbling block to successful acquisition management. 
Supporting the significance of managerial style and 
behaviour, Hayes' study of top executives who had sold their 
companies found that "extensive control or interference by the 
parent company was reported to be the prime reason for leaving by 
over two thirds of executives who left, following the 
acquisition." Further, Kitching (1967) and Cox (1981) suggested 
that many of the problems of style and expectations can be 
anticipated and the creation of false expectations can be 
eliminated by adequate planning of t,he management issues and 
implications of the acquisition. 
The main theoretical research works which cover the issues 
of managerial style and characteristics are summarised in Table 1 
below in terms of their impact at various stages of the 
acquisition process. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] ' _ 
'Fit' v. Autonomy 
By contrast with the studies which identify management 
problems of acquisition, Hayes' study of top executives involved 
in acquisitions found that 75% of those Wictims" who stayed with 
their company "enjoyed a satisfactory level of autonomy". Lack 
of autonomy was measured in terms of unsolicited parent company 
directives and decisions, excessive operating control, excessive 
reporting requirements and corporate staff interference. It 
could thus be argued that acquired companies can be isolated frcm 
6 the impact of unrelated management style through the degree of 
autonomy they enjoy. 
Therefore while we believe that a correlation exists between 
relatedness of management style and acquisition performance, 
acquisitions can be successful even in cases of unrelated 
management style where the acquiree hdd a high-level of autonomy 
post acquisition. These relationships are shown graphically 
below. 








F rom  this review, it would appear that although the significance 
of the managerial factor has been identified, insufficient 
empirical investigation has been conducted relative to the 
importance of ensuring acquisition success. 
Imnlications 
There is no guarantee that the management style and culture 
at Volkswagen and SEAT will be the same; or those of 
Habitat/Mothercare and British Home Stores; or Olivetti and 
Acorn, Monsanto and Continental Pharma; or Volvo and Clark. Yet 
the fact that they already operate successfully in the victims 
industry must surely increase the commonalities in style, 
expectation, reward structure, attitudes and jargon. 
We believe that those commonalities will also exist between 
acquirers and victims which do not share- a common industry but it 
will require far greater rigour by the acquiring management team 
to identify and cultivate the meshing of management style which 
is the key to successful acquisition. This is consistent then 
with earlier research which demonstrated that industry 
relatedness alone was not sufficient to determine merger success. 
. 
Research confirmation of these hypotheses would not only 
have an impact on companies approach to acquisition as a 
competitive strategy but also on European anti-trust legislation. 
For if industry relatedness increases the probability of a 'fit' 
in Management style and culture, the various governments anti- 
trust bodies are busy preventing the mergers which are most 
likely to succeed. 
Review of Management Charactaristics and 
Style issues raised in Acquisition Research 
Timing Issues Reference 
Pre AcqdsitiOn Familiarity leads to lack Power (1985) 
Planning of internal consultation. 
Failure to allocate Mace & Montgomery 
responsibility for the (1962) 
acquisition to a key 
individual. 
Failure to anticipate Kitching (1967) 
people issues results cox (1981) 
in false expectations. 
Negotiations Involvement of CEO Power (1985) 
decreases with number of 
. . acquisitions. 
Failure of integration Cox (1981) 
team to be involved in 
negotiations. 
Expectations created Hayes (1981) 
which are not sub- 
sequently realised. 
Post acquisition Lack of broad executive Mace & Montgomery 
Management* involvement may lead to (1962) 
the development of in- Kitching (1967) 
effective procedures for 
implementation 6 control. 
Morale problems result 
from: 
Harvey (1969) 
Ansoff et al(1971) 
immediately firing or 
freezing out unwanted 
executives 
Failing to agree on an 
appropriate organi- 
zational structure 
Failing to divide 
responsibility for the 
integration process 
equally between the 
acquiring and acquired 
firms. 
Condescending attitude 
to the victim 
Degree of control 
exercised by the parent 
resulting in high top 
management turnover 






Team responsible for 
the acquisition 
Mace t Montgomery 
(1962) 
* Partially adopted from Seetoo (1977) 
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